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lent intent or not."' However, in order to annul an alienation
made by the husband after suit for a separation is filed, it must
be proved that there was a fraudulent view of injuring the
rights of the wife6 2 A debt which is contracted in contraven-
tion of Article 150 is not chargeable to the community, but
must be charged to the husband's separate estate.63 Article 150
by its terms applies only to suits for separation, but there is
no reason why it should not be applicable by analogy to suits
for divorce and several courts have applied article 150 to divorce
actions . 4 The same reasons exist for preventing the husband
from contracting a debt, or alienating property, whether the
action is for separation or divorce.
Byron R. Kantrow, Jr.
THE EFFECT OF GASPARD V. LEMAIRE ON AWARDS
FOR GENERAL DAMAGES
There are several general areas in which the amount of
damages to be awarded a deserving tort claimant is not easily
determined, but particularly difficult problems stand out in de-
termining the amount of awards for pain and suffering. Such
awards are of necessity arbitrary, since pain and suffering are
not commodities which may be assessed in pecuniary terms.'
61. See note 60 supra.
62. See note 60 supra.
63. Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). According
to the court in Davis v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 651, 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) the
wife has the burden of proving that the husband violated article 150 of the Civil
Code: "It will be observed from this Article that if the husband alienates im-
movable property of the community after institution of suit for separation by the
wife, before the sale can be annulled on the ground of fraudulent intent to cheat
her, she must prove that he acted with such intent and that the alienation was
consummated subsequent to the date of filing of suit for separation or divorce. In
the present case the alienation occurred four days prior to institution of the di-
vorce suit; and it has not been proven that it was fraudulently consummated.
Surely, no semblance of fraud or bad faith on the part of the Millers has been
proven and, even though Davis had been motivated by a desire to circumvent his
estranged wife's interest in the property, proof of this fact alone would not war-
rant annulment of the sale."
64. Gastauer v. Gastauer, 143 La. 749, 79 So. 326 (1918) ; Ohanna v. Ohanna,
129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
1. See Leggio v. Broussard, 162 So. 2d 23, 26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) ("no
adequate rule has yet been devised for the evaluation of pain and suffering");
Thomas v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 83 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955)
("the establishment of such a rule [for determining the quantum of damages in
personal injury cases] appears humanly impossible").
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The purpose of this Comment is not to consider the trial court's
difficult task of damage evaluation, but rather to consider the
scope of appellate review of damage awards. The problem of
appellate review of awards which are difficult to assess may
be summarized in three statements. First, Louisiana Civil Code
article 1934 (3) grants the trial court a large degree of discre-
tion in this area. 2 Second, despite this discretion, the Louisiana
Constitution requires appellate review of these awards.3 Third,
since such awards are by nature arbitrary, the appellate courts'
natural point of reference in determining whether or not an
award is proper is to consider previous awards in similar cases.
Because of the impossibility of fixing with precision awards
of this type, two different approaches have developed concern-
ing the method of determining the quantum of damages in the
area under consideration. The first approach reasons that since
this type of award does not lend itself to precise, predictable
determination, and since each case will be by nature unique, a
large amount of discretion should be left to the trial court.4
Under this rationale, it follows that an appellate court should
alter the amount of an award only where there is manifest
error on the part of the trial court, or at least a clear abuse of
the trial court's discretion. Advocates of the second approach,
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1934(3) (1870) : "Although the general rule is, that
damages are the amount of the loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of
which he has been deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed
without calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary
gain to the party. Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some
intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some con-
venience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money
by the parties, yet damages are due for their breach; a contract for a religious
or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work
of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule.
"In the assesment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offenses,
quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or
jury, while in other cases they have none, but are bound to give such damages
under the above rules as will fully indemnify the creditor, whenever the con-
tract has been broken by the fault, negligence, fraud or bad faith of the debtor."
(Emphasis added.)
3. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29. In Diggs v. Orleans Parish School Board, 161
So. 2d 433 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), a concurring opinion suggests that any
restriction placed on a party's right to appellate review by LA. CIVIL CODE art.
1934 (1870) is unconstitutional.
4. See, e.g., Cassreino v. Brown, 144 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) ("An award of damages for personal injury is of necessity somewhat
arbitrary and must vary greatly with the facts and circumstances of each case;
therefore the trial court's large discretion in making such an award should not
ordinarily be disturbed on appellate review.") ; Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137
So. 2d 415, 422 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ("The law is well settled that in the
assessment of damages, such as the ones sustained here, much discretion must be
left to the trial judge or jury.").
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recognizing that an award for pain and suffering is by nature
arbitrary, also emphasize the use of precedent as a starting
point in fixing these awards,5 the reliance on previous cases
hopefully resulting in uniformity of awards in similar cases.6
Following this approach, an a-ward for a moderately severe
whiplash injury should not be substantially more or less than
awards for moderately severe whiplash injuries in the past,
allowing for adjustment due to the changing value of the dollar.7
Under this method of attack, the reviewing appellate court would
be obligated to examine the facts of the case to determine the
exact nature of the injury, and the award must be altered if it
is not in line with awards for injuries of a similar nature. Good
arguments can be made for both lines of reasoning, and both
have ample support in Louisiana jurisprudence."
These two methods of fixing damages at first seem mutually
exclusive, one giving the trial court almost unlimited discretion,
and the other fixing a definite, almost mechanical method for
determining damages of an inexact nature. It may be suggested,
however, that the first ground for appellate interference with
the trial court's discretion, that of abuse, is not only compatible
with, but dependent upon, the second ground, that of con-
sistency.9 A careful examination of the cases posing problems
5. See, e.g., Broussard v. Lormand, 138 So. 2d 677, 681 (La. App. 3d Cir.
i962) ("It is well recognized that awards made in similar cases are to be con-
sidered by the courts so that within the limits permitted by particular states
of fact a degree of uniformity will be maintained") ; Thomas v. Great Am. Indem.
Co., 83 So. 2d 485, 488 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955) ("We have concluded that an
award of $7,000 is . . . more consistent with awards in comparable cases.").
6. Cassreino v. Brown, 144 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962 ("there
should be some degree of uniformity, so that awards will not be all out of pro-
portion with one another"). Similar language is used in almost all cases which
altered the amount of an award for personal injuries prior to Gaspard v. LeMaire,
245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963). See text at note 11 infra.
: 7. See Winfree v. Consolidated Underwriters, 163 So. 2d 377, 381 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964) ("The value of the dollar has been steadily decreasing over the
past years. What may have been an appropriate amount for an award for a
particular injury in . . . the 1940's or the 1950's, would not be an appropriate
amount in the 1960's. One cannot buy as much with a dollar today as he could
in decades past.").
8. See, e.g., McFarland v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 241 La. 15, 127 So. 2d 183
(1961) ; White v. Robbins, 153 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Hickman v.
Bawcom; 149 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Broussard v. Lormand, 138
So. 2d 677 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Doyle v. McMahon, 136 So. 2d 89 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) ; Carhee v. Scott, 104 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
9. The awareness that the scope of the trial court's discretion is bounded by
the need for uniformity is clearly seen in the case of Landry v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960), where
the court said: "[A]wards made in similar cases should be considered . . . , so
that, within the limits permitted by particular states of facts, a degree of uni-
formity will be maintained." (Emphasis added.) Arguments which attack this
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concerning the amount of damages for loss of support, loss of
love and companionship, pain, mental anguish, and similar af-
flictions, reveals that even where considerable emphasis is
placed on one approach, the influence of the other method will
still be felt. The language of the cases, when quoted out of con-
text, appears to suggest a sharp dichotomy between uniformity
of awards on one side and discretion of the trial court on the
other. When the full texts of the opinions are examined, how-
ever, it becomes apparent that most of the cases calling for uni-
formity of awards recognize that awards in similar cases are
only a starting point for the trial court in determining the
proper award.' 0
Considerable controversy over damage awards has been
created by the recent case of Gaspard v. LeMaire.11 There a
jury award of $19,500 for a back injury was reduced by the
Louisiana Supreme Court to $8,500 on the ground that the
award was out of proportion with previous awards for similar
injuries. On rehearing the court reinstated the original jury
award of $19,500, saying that the large discretion of the trial
court should be respected, and that uniformity of awards should
not be a goal of the reviewing appellate court.12 The court said
that "the appellate courts should consider the amount of awards
in other cases only so far as they are relevant to the question
of whether the judge or jury has abused its discretion in fixing
the award in the case under consideration."1 3
Prior to the Gaspard decision, guidelines established in
Cassreino v. Brown 14 were frequently used in deciding whether
or not an award was excessive or inadequate. The Cassreino
opinion repeated the language often used to point out that dam-
and similar cases for supporting the idea of uniformity of awards as an end in
itself usually conveniently ignore the italicized words.
10. See Ropollo v. State, 23 So. 2d 374, 375 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) : "[A]a
is so frequently stated by the courts, authorities cited on a question of quantum
may very well serve as a guide to the court but they should not be controlling."
11. 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963).
12. The position of the appellate courts prior to Gaspard seems lucidly
illustrated by the language used in Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415,
422 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), in which the court said: "[It] is well settled that
• . . much discretion must be left to the trial judge or jury. However, our juris-
prudence is likewise well settled, that awards made by a jury are subject to
review by an appellate court and will be altered in the event of an abuse of dis-
cretion. Furthermore, awards made in similar cases should be considered by our
courts, so that a degree of uniformity will be maintained to the end that awards
will not be out of all proportion, one with the other." (Emphasis added.)
13. 245 La. at 266, 158 So. 2d at 158 (1963) (on rehearing).
14. 144 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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ages for personal injuries are necessarily arbitrary in nature
and the trial court's discretion in making such an award should
therefore be respected, but, on the other hand, there should be
:"some degree of uniformity, so that awards will not be all out
of proportion with one another."'15 (Emphasis added.) Cassreino
involved a whiplash injury, and, after an extensive review of
awards for other whiplash injuries, the court outlined three
broad categories of whiplash injuries and the range of awards
for each category. 10 The categories, intended as an aid for sub-
sequent cases, were developed after a careful examination of
previous awards for whiplash injuries, and would seem to be
a useful aid for subsequent cases if cautiously used. Cassreino
was referred to with disapproval by the Supreme Court on re-
hearing in the Gaspard decision,'1 7 and for a while the court of
appeal judges seemed divided in their opinion whether Gaspard
actually overruled Cassreino and forbade the use of the cate-
gories of injuries there outlined.' 8 The Supreme Court recently
attempted to settle this controversy in Winfree v. Consolidated
Underwriters9 by saying that "insofar as [the Cassreino case]
classifies whiplash injuries in three categories with a fixed
award for each category, we now specifically overrule that
case."'20 It should be noted, however, that while the Supreme
Court was specifically overruling the Cassreino decision, it af-
firmed a reduction by the court of appeal of an award of $8000
for a "moderate whiplash injury" to $3000, and an award of
$3000 for a whiplash injury was reduced to $1500. From the
description of the injuries, it would appear that the first injury
15. Id. at 610.
16. The decision suggests three basic categories of whiplash injuries, citing
cases for the amounts of awards in each category: (1) injuries which produced
permanent disability or severe pain of prolonged duration were conceived to be
satisfied by awards in excess of $5,000.00; (2) injuries which caused severe
initial pain with only a short period of residual discomfort, or which produced
less severe pain but a relatively long period (e.g., more than one year) of residual
discomfort, deserved an award between $2,500.00 and $3,500.00; and (3) in-
juries which produced only moderate or slight pain and which were cured without
residual discomfort in a matter of weeks were compensated by awards below
$2,500.00.
17. 245 La. at 263, 158 So. 2d at 158 (1963).
18.. See, e.g., Poleman v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 164 So. 2d 630 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964), in which the appellate court found that since a whiplash
injury could fit into the first category of Cassreino, an award of $10,000 was
not all out of proportion for similar injuries in previous cases. See also Roy v.
United Gas Corp., 163 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), in which the court
examined, the details of the plaintiff's injury and based the amount of the award
on, Cassreino.
19. 169 So. 2d 71 (La. 1964).
20. Id. at 72.
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would fall in the $2500-$3000 category suggested by Cassreino,
while the second injury should properly be awarded below $2500
under the Cassreino decision. It thus seems that the Supreme
Court will allow the categories of the Cassreino case to be used
as guidelines in determining whether an award is so out of
proportion with previous awards as to constitute an "abuse of
discretion." This method of review appears to be useful for
determining whether an abuse of the trial court's discretion
has occurred, as long as the established categories are broad
enough to remain flexible and are not applied mechanically.
The Supreme Court's concern over undue reliance on pre-
vious awards in determining the amount of awards for pain
and suffering did not originate with the Gaspard case. An
earlier case, McFarland v. Illinois Cent. Ry.,21 contains lan-
guage which is closely parallel to the text of the rehearing in
Gaspard. Although McFarland involved an action for wrongful
death, the language used and the cases which followed it show
that the court was also concerned with similar problems involved
in pain and suffering awards. 22 The Supreme Court noted that
damages of this type could not be determined upon any scientific
basis, and said that the amounts of these awards must be left
"more or less" to the discretion of the trial court.23 The language
of the McFarland case is, if anything, stronger than the lan-
guage of the Gaspard case in its insistence that, under Louisiana
Civil Code article 1934(3), the district court has broad discre-
tion in making these awards and that the award of the district
court is not to be disturbed on review unless there has been an
abuse of discretion..2 4
It is apparent from the McFarland case and others decided
prior to 1963 that the Gaspard decision does not establish a new
line of thinking in Louisiana jurisprudence concerning the role
of the appellate courts in determining the amounts of awards
21. 241 La. 15, 127 So. 2d 183 (1961).
22. The court of appeal had used a mathematical formula to determine the
amount of the award for wrongful death in the McFarland case, 122 So. 2d 845
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1960), and the Supreme Court expressed strong disapproval
of such formula. 241 La. at 25, 127 So. 2d at 187 (1961).
23. The court emphasized that while an arbitrary formula for fixing 'such
awards may be desirable, the establishment of such a formula is a legislative,
rather than judicial, function. 241 La. at 25, 127 So. 2d at 187.
* 24. However, after carefully pointing out the extreme degree of caution to
be used by the appellate courts, the Supreme Court then concluded that "there was
a slight abuse of discretion by the trial court," and consequently increased the
amount of the award. 241 La. at 25, 127 So. 2d at 187.
!550 (Vol. XXV
COMMENTS
for pain and suffering. However, the Supreme Court did cite
,with disapproval several court of appeal decisions in the Gas-
pard case, and criticized those decisions for placing too much
emphasis on uniformity of awards and thus robbing the trial
court of the discretion given to it by article 1934.25 Does the
Gaspard decision thus have the effect of overruling a line of
cases which seem to require uniformity? The answer is prob-
ably no, because a close examination of the disapproved cases
shows that while the cases referred to use previous cases as a
guide in determining whether to alter the award of the trial
court or leave it unchanged, the court in every case realized
that the facts. of each particular situation are unique and pre-
vious awards may be relied upon, but only as far as similarities
will allow.
If, as suggested, the Gaspard case neither establishes a com-
.pletely new policy for reviewing damage awards nor overrules
.a group of previous cases, the question of its practical effect
on damage awards still remains unanswered. It is suggested
that the Gaspard decision calls for a shifting of emphasis rather
than a totally new approach to the problem of damages. The
fact that appellate courts are duty bound to review the amounts
of damage awards remains unchanged; and, for lack of a better
guide, awards in previous, similar situations will be used in
determining whether the award of the trial court, notwithstand-
ing its undisputed discretion in the area, will be altered. What
may possibly be changed by the Gaspard decision is the attitude
taken by the courts of appeal and the manner in which they go
about sustaining or altering the award of the lower court. In
most pre-Gaspard decisions, the appellate courts, in reviewing
an award for pain and suffering, would carefully scrutinize the
individual facts of the particular injury and, if they altered
the award, would base their decision on the principle that uni-
formity of awards, as far as possible, should be maintained. 26
Since the Gaspard case, however, the phrase "uniformity of
*awards" has been scrupulously avoided, but in its place has
'been substituted an equally nebulous expression, the key words
now being "abuse of discretion. ' 27 If there has been an "abuse
25. 245 La. at 263, 158 So. 2d at 158.
26. See Williams v. W. R. Pickering Lumber Co., 125 La. 1087, 52 So. 167
(1910) ; Broussard v. Lormand, 138 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Warren
v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 99 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
27. See, e.g., Thomas v. Paper Haulers, Inc., 165 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964) ; Bee v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 165 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ;
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of discretion" on the part of the trial judge or jury, the appel-
late court can alter the award and still be consistent with Lou-
isiana Civil Code article 1934. The obvious problem which arises
is, of course, how to determine whether an abuse of discretion
has occurred. The phrase does not readily lend itself to precise
definition, and no attempt at defining it has been made in the
cases, but its ambit seems to be somewhere between mere
"error" and "manifest error. '28 Regardless of the phraseology
used, it seems apparent that the courts will continue to examine
closely the circumstances of the injury and compare the amount
of the award with awards in prior, similar cases.
The total effect of the Gaspard decision has not yet been
determined. The appellate courts are still reviewing and altering
awards for pain and suffering and are still using prior cases as
a guide in determining what the amount of an award should
be.29 After the decisions in Ballard v. National Indem. Co.80
and Winfree v. Consolidated Underwriters,8 ' it is clear that
careful scrutiny of trial court awards by appellate courts will be
continued, and that while the awards of the lower courts will
not be altered in order to "maintain uniformity of awards in
similar cases," an award which the appellate court considers
improper will be altered. It is submitted that the Supreme
Lege v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 164 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; Thibodeaux
v. Sternberg, 164 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; Jacobs v. Marquette Cas.
Co., 164 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; Taylor v. Kendall, 162 So. 2d 156
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
The language used in Taylor clearly illustrates that prior awards in similar
situations are used in determining whether there has been an "abuse of discre-
tion." After reviewing all the facts concerning the injury, the court said: "After
reviewing the cases cited to us on quantum, and in view of the nature of the
injuries . . . , we find the district court did not abuse its discretion." 162 So. 2d
at 160.
See also Maryland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964) ; Cole v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 160 So. 2d 785, 790-91 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964) ("We agree . . . that the evidence could reasonably justify a much
more substantial award . . . . Considering all the circumstances . . . , we are
unable to say that the trial judge abused its large discretion . . . or that . . . this
award is manifestly insufficient."); Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 159 So. 2d 5,
11 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (citing Gaspard as authority, the court said, "the
amount of damages awarded . . . is not out of proportion to awards made in
similar cases, and accordingly, we find that the trial judge has not abused his
discretion").
28. For a comprehensive discussion of the meaning of "manifest error" as
used by Louisiana courts, see Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 402 (1961).
29. E.g., Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 159 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
30. 169 So. 2d 64 (La. 1964).
31. Id. at 71.
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Court's warning that the discretion of the trial court should be
respected should be accepted only as a matter of degree,8 2 and
that awards in previous cases will still be considered by the
reviewing court.
A. L. Wright, 11
32. See Ayres v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 866, 867 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964) : "In Gaspard v. LeMaire our Supreme Court reminded the appellate courts
that greater consideration should be given to the principle enunciated in LSA-C.C.
Art. 1934, § 3."
